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The Associated States of the
Commonwealth Caribbean: The Constitutions
and the Individual
WILLIAM C. GILMORE*
I. INTRODUCTION
With the demise of the West Indies Federation in 1962 1 and the
subsequent inability of the Leeward Islands, Windward Islands and
Barbados to establish a "truncated" federation in the Eastern Carib-
bean, 2 the British authorities were faced in the Commonwealth
Caribbean 3 with the problem of devising a scheme of partial decol-
onization which could come to terms with the social, political, and
economic realities of the separate societies of the smaller Eastern is-
lands:
Some had the resources adequate to support the usual attributes of
internal self-government; none had a population of over 100,000, or
the revenue a country would need to sustain the trappings of full
independence, and none appeared anxious to gyrate on the inter-
national scene. On the other hand, the United Kingdom was com-
mitted to decolonization as rapidly as possible, seeing no reason to
present itself any longer as a major target for anticolonialist rancour
at the United Nations. 4
LL.B. (Edin.), LL.M. (Lond.). Commonwealth Projects Officer, Institute of Inter-
national Law and Economic Development, Washington, D.C. Formerly, Lecturer
in Law, The University of the West Indies, Barbados. This work was made pos-
sible through the financial assistance of the Ford Foundation and the National
Science Foundation who are in no way responsible for its contents.
1. For the statutory authorization for the creation of the Federation and for its
constitutions see R. PREIS\VERK, DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN
THE CARIBBEAN 285-329 (1970). A concise account of the factors contributing to the
demise of the Federation is, Springer, Federation in the Caribbean: An Attempt that
Failed, in THE AFTERMATH OF SOVEREIGNTY 189-213 (1973).
2. Lewis, The Agony of Eight, in THE AFTERMATH OF SOVEREIGNTY (1973);
Marshall, Attempts at Windward/Leeward Federation, 18 CARIB. Q. 9-15 (1972);
Phillips, A Decade of West Indian Constitutionalism, 1957-1967, at 105 (1968) (un-
published M. Cl. Thesis, McGill University, Montreal). Barbados subsequently be-
came independent, see generally REPORT OF THE BARBADOS CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
FERENCE, CMND No. 3058 (1966). For the original text of the Barbadian Constitu-
tion see BARBADOS STAT. INST. 1966, No. 1455, 2d Sched.
3. The term "Commonwealth Caribbean" is now commonly used to indicate all
of the past and present possessions of the United Kingdom within the Caribbean
region, including Guyana and 'Belize.
4. S.A. DE SMITH, MICROSTATES AND MICRONESIA 69 (1970).
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To the British authorities, neither independence nor traditional
formulas of colonial government seemed appropriate.5  In response to
these needs there evolved, in the summer of 1965, the basic outlines
of a new constitutional experiment to be placed in the decolonization
"laboratory" of the Caribbean; 6 it was that of statehood in association
with the "mother country."
Based substantially on the existing relationship between New
Zealand and the Cook Islands, 7 the association experiment consisted
of four parts. First, there would be a grant of virtual automony, to
the six territories I in their internal affairs. Second, the individual
units would be given the power to unilaterally terminate the status of
association and move on to independence should they so desire.
Third, the United Kingdom was to remain responsible for the exer-
cise of power and authority in the spheres of external affairs, defense,
citizenship, and "royalty." In this regard, the United Kingdom was to
retain the executive and legislative capacity necessary to carry out
these tasks in full. Finally, assurances were given to the effect that
the territories would remain eligible to receive aid from Britain. It
was also recognized that direct budgetary aid would not be pre-
cluded. 9
This status relationship was finally embodied in the West Indies
Act of 1967.10 Since that time, the plan has attracted a fair amount
of academic comment, 11 particularly in relation to the nature of the
5. Certain of the delegations at the Windward Islands Constitutional Conference
asked the United Kingdom to consider the alternative of a grant of full internal self-
government along the lines of the more traditional colonial formula. See REPORT OF
THE WINDVARD ISLANDS CONSTUTIONAL CONFERENCE, CMND No. 3021 (1966),
at 6-7 [hereinafter cited as WINDWARD ISLANDS CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE].
6. The use of the term "laboratory" is one borrowed from Ince, The Decoloniza-
tion of Grenada in the U.N., in INDEPENDENCE FOR GRENADA-MYTH OR REALITY?
43 (1976). At the time of the formulation of these proposals there existed, within the
Caribbean, examples of the three basic methods of decolonization thus far attempted;
full independence, integration into the body politic of the metropole, and Common-
wealth status as it existed in Puerto Rico.
7. See the statement of Lord Brockway, 280 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) col. 162
(1967). For a review of the Cook Islands scheme see A. LEIBOWITZ, COLONIAL
EMANCIPATION IN THE PACIFIC AND THE CARIBBEAN 132-46 (1976).
8. Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts (St. Christopher)/Nevis/Anguilla, St.
Lucia, and St. Vincent. Montserrat, with its land area of 39.5 square miles and popu-
lation of 15,000, was to retain its Crown Colony status without immediate change.
9. See generally CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS for Antigua, St. Kitts/Nevis/
Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada. CMND No. 2865 (1965) [here-
inafter cited as CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS].
10. West Indies Act, 1967, c. 4.
11. See generally Broderick, Associated Statehood, 17 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 368
(1968), and W. Gilmore, Legal Perspectives on Associated Statehood in the Eastern
Caribbean (forthcoming).
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precarious balance between internal automony, reserved powers, and
unilateral termination. 12 However, little attention has thus far been
paid to the new internal constitutional structures which came into
effect with the advent of Associated Statehood. It is the intention of
this paper to take a first step in redressing that imbalance in the
literature.
In approaching this task, the author will endeavor, by way of an
overview or "macro" approach, to illustrate the essential structural
elements of the systems of democratic government which have been
introduced in these West Indian states. In addition, and of equal im-
portance, the author will seek to convey an understanding of the na-
ture and extent of individual rights, duties, and obligations within
those structures. Such an examination will also attempt to provide
some insights into the implicit assumptions upon which the
Westminster system of government is based. 13
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
Origins of the Constitutions
From the time of the 1965 "Oxford Conference,"' 4 it had been
agreed that, upon the introduction of Associated Statehood, new con-
stitutional structures for the islands would be promulgated. 15 The
nature and extent of these changes were discussed at the various con-
stitutional conferences in 1966,16 and generally were agreed to by
both British and island representatives. 17
Thus, under the authority of section 5(1) of the West Indies Act,
Her Majesty was given the necessary powers to provide for such new
12. See, e.g., P. ALLEYNE, C. GAIRAJ & H.J. GEISER, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION (1976); W. BRISK, THE DILEMMA OF A MINI-STATE: AN-
GUILLA (1969); Simmonds, Associated Statehood: A Caribbean Dilemma, in 2 Mis-
CELLANEA W.J. GANSHOF VAN DER MEERSCH: STUDIA AD DISCIPULIS AMICISQUE
IN HONOREM EGREGII PROFESSORIS EDITA 455 (1972).
13. See Patchett, Legal Problems of the Mini-State: The Caribbean Experience,
1975 CAMBRIAN L. REv. 57 [hereinafter cited as The Caribbean Experience].
14. For a brief description of this rather unusual event see, 740 PArd,. DEB.,
H.C. (5th ser.) 337 (1967).
15. See CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS, supra note 9, at 5-11.
16. See generally REPORT OF THE ANTIGUA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE,
CMND No. 2963 (1966); REPORT OF THE ST. KITTs/NEvis/ANGUILLA CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONFERENCE CMND No. 3031 (1966); WINDWARD ISLANDS CON-
STITUTIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 5.
17. In the context of the Grenada discussion in particular, opposition elements
objected to the formulation agreed upon in a number of key areas. See WINDWARD
ISLANDS CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 5, at 42-47.
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constitutions by way of Orders in Council. In each case, the new
constitutions became operative on the day that the new status took
effect,' with the intent that they "be a meaningful and authoritative
expression of a permanent, as distinct from a transitional, system of
government." 19
These individual constitutional instruments are characterized by
a substantial similarity both in terms of their general approach to the
overall structure of government and in terms of the specific provisions
adopted to implement that structure.2 0 This is not to say, however,
that they are all identical for, as shall be discussed below, there are
certain substantive differences between them, which were inserted to
take account of particular local conditions or political views.
The new con'stitutions also bear a striking resemblance to the
fundamental laws of the then independent Commonwealth Caribbean
States,21 in particular, those of Jamaica and Barbados; 2 2 in fact, it
appears that "the leaders of the smaller territories would have no
less." 23
18. The appropriate constitutional citations are as follows: ANTIGUA STAT. INST.
1967 [hereinafter cited as ANTIGUA CONST.], No. 225, 2d Sched.; DOMINICA STAT.
INST. 1967 [hereinafter cited as DOMINICA CONST.], No. 226, 2d Sched.; GRENADA
STAT. INST. 1967 [hereinafter cited as GRENADA CONST.], No. 227, 2d Sched.; ST.
KITTs/NEvIS/ANGUILLA STAT. INST. 1967 [hereinafter cited as ST. KITTS CONST.),
No. 228, 2d Sched.; ST. LUCIA STAT. INST. 1967 [hereinafter cited as ST. LUCIA
CONST.], No 229, 2d Sched.; ST. VINCENT STAT. INST. 1969 [hereinafter cited as
ST. VINCENT CONST.], No. 1500, 2d Sched. Since Grenada is no longer a state in
association with the United Kingdom, references to its former constitution will he
inserted only when circumstances so require. The present anomalous situation in
Anguilla will not be treated here; see W. Gilmore, supra note 11, at Part c.
19. Forbes, The West Indies Associated States: Some Aspects of the Constitu-
tional Arrangements, 19 SOCIAL & ECON. STUDIES 59 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Constitutional Arranginents].
20. See SIR F. PHILLIPS, FREEDOM IN TIlE CAR1BEAN 81 (1977). See also
Forbes, Subsidiary Lawmaking Process: Antigua, Dominica and St. Kitts, 18 INT'L &
tOMP. L.Q. 533, 534 (1969).
21. At that time, these were BARBADOS STAT. INST. 1966, No. 1455, 2d Sched.;
GUYANA STAT. INST. 1966, No. 575, 2d Sched.; JAMAICA STAT. INST. 1962, No.
1550, 2d Sched.; and TRINIDAD AND TOHAGO STAT. INST. 1962, No. 1875, 2d
Sched.
22. For instance, Trinidad and Tobago adopted a rather different form for the
protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, while Guyana, although adopting a
unicameral legislature, provided for election by way of proportional representation.
Neither of the above is reflected in any of the constitutions of the Associated States.
As we have noted elsewhere, one should recall that the constitution of Barbados was
itself considerably influenced by that of Jamaica. See Gilmore, Sugar and Agricultural
Diversification in the Barbadian Economy: An Overview, 198-204 (1977) (unpublished
M.A. thesis, N.P.S.I.A., Carleton University, Ottawa).
23. Phillips, supra note 2, at 118.
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The relevance of these independence enactments was specifically
mentioned by Mrs. Hart, then Minister of State for Commonwealth
Affairs, upon the occasion of the Second Reading of the West Indies
Bill. She stated, in part; that each enactment "contains the provisions
which are normal in a modern independence Constitution, subject to
the requirements of our responsibility for defense and external affairs,
and also the preservation of a common citizenship." 24 Notwithstand-
ing these qualifications, the constitutions of the Associated States dif-
fer from the earlier independence enactments in other respects.2 5
Although it is arguable that insufficient attention may have been
paid to "the legal problems which are the consequence of... small-
ness," 26 a recognition of these factors did have an impact on the na-
ture of certain constitutional provisions. In this regard, the conposi-
tion of the legislature and the judicature, and the roles of the Attor-
neys General, the Directors of Public Prosecution, and the "Speak-
ers" are perhaps the most obvious examples of the individual tailoring
of the constitutions. 27 All of these constitutional documents are simi-
lar in the sense that they seek to reproduce, in some fashion, the
basic elements of what has come to be known as "the Westminster
model" of parliamentary democracy. 28
In spite of the fact that serious questions have been posed as to
the utility of exporting such a structure of government to underde-
veloped entities,2 9 it appears that no serious consideration, on either
side, was given to the possibility of fundamental innovation. The basic
reasons for this omission, which is by no means confined to the
Caribbean territories, are perhaps best expressed in the following
words of the late Professor de Smith:
Administering coumtries have tended to reproduce their own con-
stitutional features in their dependent territories. Their wards,
after having served a prolonged and zealous pupilage, will in due
course be admitted to membership of that select club which enjoys
24. 740 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 340 (1967).
25. See Phillips, supra note 2, at 118-
26. Patchett, The Caribbean Experience, supra note 13, at 57.
27. See notes 61-86 infra and accompanying text.
28. Lord Diplock stated that -there can be discerned in all those constitutions
which have their origin in an Act of the Imperial Parliament at Westminster or in an
Order in Council, a common pattern and stvle of draftsmanship which may conve-
niently he described as the 'Westminster model.'" Hinds v. The Queen [1976] 1 All
E.R. 353, 360.
29. See, e.g., REPOBT OF TIHE TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO CONSTITUTION COMMIS-
SION 7, 13 (1974) [hereinafter cited as TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO REPORT]. Similar
views have been frequently expressed elsewhere.
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the full benefits of the metropolitan system of government. And
the very fact of being denied some of these privileges, ostensibly
on the ground that they are not ready to receive them, has stimu-
lated among dependent peoples a clamant demand for the authen-
tic article.30
Thus, not only do the constitutional elements in question reflect the
"master craftsmanship of the Colonial Office"" l and hence reflect
British self-interest, they also meet the expressed desires and aspira-
tions of the local political leaders.3 2 Consequently, it is apparent that
the basic purpose of these clearly non-autochthonous constitutional
creations 33 was to reproduce "the form of government and the bal-
ance of powers evolved in the United Kingdom."
3 4
The version of the Westminster system adopted by the As-
sociated States can be more accurately described as a colonial export
model, in that it differs from the existing British system in several
important respects: the absence of the doctrine of the sovereignty of
Parliament, the existence of the power of judicial review, the specifi-
cation of fundamental rights provisions, and the fact that these con-
stitutions are committed to writing.
There are, in addition, a host of relatively minor changes which
implant as rules of law many of the recognized British political and
constitutional conventions: -[T]he Westminster model has undergone
a number of modifications in its journeys overseas. Most of these
modifications have been designed either to give concrete expressions
to principles which in Britian rest upon unwritten understandings or
to afford reassurance to minority groups." 3 5
30. S.A. DE SMITH, supra note 4, at 95. The desire to ensure the continuity of a
structure with which many were familiar was more important within a Jamaican con-
text than in the case of Associated States. See notes 170-173 infra and accompanying
text.
31. Forbes, Constitutional Arrangements, supra note 19, at 58.
32- See generally Munroe, Origins of the Jamaica Independence Constitution,
1972 JAMAICA L.J. 58. For an "ontological" overview and analysis of the processes
used in its drafting, see Kelly, The Jamaican Independence Constitution of 1962, 3
CARIB. STUD. 18 (1962).
33. Autochthony, from the Creek meaning "sprung from that land itself." An
autochthonous constitution is, following the precedent established by K.C. Wheare,
one which is not imported from the United Kingdom. See K.C. WHEARE, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH 89 (1960). It is also difficult
to classify such constitutions as autochthonous in a political sense. See Munroe, supra
note 32, at 65-66.
34. Patchett, English Law in the West Indies: A Conference Report, 12 INT'L &
CoMP. L.Q. 922, 923 (1963).
35. S.A. DE SMITH, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH AND ITS CONSTITUTIONS 107
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Each of the constitutional instruments in question establishes the
principal organs of government, defines their interrelationships, and
imposes limitations within which each must operate.
The Head of State
Each of the territories retains the British Monarch as the head of
State.3 6  Her Majesty is to be represented locally by a Governor.
Unlike the position of Governor in the more traditional type of colo-
nial relationship, however, such a person is, by and large, "relieved
of any political or legal responsibility for the actual business of gov-
ernment." '3 7 As in the Dominions and the independent Common-
wealth Caribbean states which are not Republics, 35 the office of Gov-
ernor in the Associated States is designed to provide a symbol of and
a focal point for national unity. The Governor is appointed by Her
Majesty, primarily upon the advice of the local Premier. 39
In practice, the formulation of principles on such appointments
would appear to be somewhat more restrictive of local control than
had been anticipated at the time of the 1965 Constitutional Propos-
als. 40 Although the appropriate British Minister (in practice, the
Secretary of State) will normally follow the recommendation of the
local Premier in tendering advice to the Monarch, he will not do so if
he finds "that there are substantial reasons to act otherwise." 4 1 In the
(1964). In the analogous case of Jamaica, Munroe stated, "(A)ny violence done to
Westminster procedures was justified primarily in terms of inscribing Westminster
conventions in the structure of the sovereign Jamaican State." T. MUNROE, THE
POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECOLONIZATION JAXMAICA 1944-1962, at 157 (1972).
36. See ANTIGUA CONST.; § 17; DOMINICA CONST., § 18; ST. KITTS CONST.,
§ 19; ST. LUCIA CONST., § 19; and ST. VINCENT CONST., § 19.
37. Forbes, Constitutional Arrangements, supra note 19, at 68.
38. Following their independence, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago have trans-
formed themselves into Republics; the remaining states have not.
39. This intent was first expressed at the time of the 1965 Constitutional Propos-
als:
The Queen's Representative will be appointed by Her Majesty. In relation
to such appointments it will he understood, although not expressed in law,
that the Secretary of State will be guided by the advice of the Chief Minis-
ter of the Territory when submitting advice to Her Majesty; there will be
consultation between the British Govenment and the Chief Minister be-
fore the Chief Minister makes any recommendation to the Secretary of
State.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS, supra note 9, at 5.
40. Commonwealth Office Grenada Dispatch No. 83 of 22 February 1967 (H.
Bowden to I.G. Turbott, Administrator of Grenada. The conditions were accepted by
Grenada in Dispatch No. 58 of 23 February 1967 (I.G. Turbott to H. Bowden).
41. Dispatch of February 22, supra note 40, at para. 2(b).
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final analysis, the understanding protects the position of the local
Premier only to the extent that consultations on the appointment are
mandatory and that "the United Kingdom Minister will not advise
Her Majesty to appoint a person known by him to be unacceptable to
the Premier." 
4 2
The above formula is less reflective of local autonomy than that
used for the independent entities of the Commonwealth; what this
indicates "is that the British Government wishes to take a much more
direct interest in the appointment of the Queen's Representative in
the associated states than in the case of independent states." '4 3
The Executive
It is within the sphere of executive activity that the influence of
the "pure" Westminster model is most evident. The primary distin-
guishing factor lies in the fact that "the conventions which have
evolved in the United Kingdom constitution have been committed to
a written form and [become] a legal obligation" in the Associated
States' constitutions. 44
As a formal matter, the executive authority of the State is vested
in Her Majesty and exercised on her behalf by the Governor, either
directly or through officers subordinate to him. 45 In reality, how-
ever, such powers inhere in the Cabinet and, except in certain
extraordinary circumstances, the Governor is directed to act in ac-
cordance with the advice of that body. 4 6
The Cabinet structure is accorded official constitutional recogni-
tion and it is to be collectively responsible to Parliament for the gen-
eral direction and control of the government. 47 It is comprised of
the Premier and such other persons as may be appointed by the
Governor acting upon his advice. 48 Its members, with the possible
42. Id. at para. 2(c).
43. Forbes, Constitutional Arrangements, supra note 19, at 69.
44. Patchett, English Law in the West Indies, supra note 34, at 923.
45. See ANTICUA CONST., § 17; DOMINICA CONST., § 18; Sr. KITTs CONS.,
§ 19; ST. LUCIA CONST., § 19; and ST. VINCENT CONST., § 19.
46. ANTIGUA CoNsT., § 69(1); DOMINICA CONST., § 55(1); ST. KITTS CONST.,
§ 55(1); ST. LUCIA CONST., § 56(1); ST. VINCENT CONST., § 55(1).
47. ANTIGUA CONST., § 61(1); DOMINICA CONST., § 52(3); ST. KITTS CONSr.,
§ 52(1); ST. LUCIA CONST., § 53(2); ST. VINCENT CONST., § 52(2).
48. E.g., ANTIGUA CONST., § 62(3).
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exception of the Attorney General, 49 are to be drawn from the legisla-
tive body or bodies.5"
InI the affairs of the Cabinet, the Office of the Premier, as is
normal, is the locus of power. Not only does he control the appoint-
ment of his Cabinet colleagues and their removal, he is also responsi-
ble for the assignment of all of the portfolios of government. 1 In
addition, he summons the Cabinet,5 2 and advises the Governor on
the appointment of all Parliamentarv Secretaries. 53 In recognition of
his position of preeminence within the governmental structure, the
Premier also retains the power to appoint key figures to both the
legislative body 5 4 and the civil service. 55
Following the traditional formula, the Premier is selected by the
Governor. The Antigua Constitution states:
The Governor, acting in his discretion shall appoint as Premier the
member of the House of Representatives who appears to him best
able to command the support of the majority of the members of
that House and who is willing to be appointed.
56
Yet, in an area characterized by large Parliamentary majorities, 57 the
Governor exercises this discretionary power only in the rare event
that no party has an absolute majority in the "House."
The Premier will continue to hold office as long as he remains a
member of the House of Representatives and maintains the confi-
dence of the legislature. Unlike in the United Kingdom, a lack of
confidence must normally be expressed in the form of a resolution of
no confidence in the Government.5 8  The Governor also may, in his
discretion, remove a Premier from office prior to the first meeting of
the Legislature if, subsequent to a general election, "he considers
that in consequence of changes in the membership of the House re-
49. ANTICUA CONST., § 61(3); DoMINICA CONST., § 52(2); ST. KITTS CONST.,
§ 51(2); ST. LUCIA CONST., § 104(4); ST. VINCENT CONST., § 52(2).
50. E.g., ST. VINCENT CONST.,'§ 51(4).
51. ANTICUA CONST., § 65; DOMINICA CONST., § 53; ST. KITTS CONST., § 53;
ST. LUCIA CONST., § 54; ST. VINCENT CONST., § 53.
52. E.g., ANTIGUA CONST., § 66.
53. E.g., DOMINICA CONST., § 59.
54. See generally notes 60-101 infra and accompanying text.
55. But see notes 138-158 infra and accompanying text.
56. ANTIGUA Co\NsT., § 62(6). See also )OMINICA CONS'r., § 51(2); ST. KITTS
CONST., § 50(2); ST. LUCIA CONST., § 51(2); ST. VINCENT CONST., § 51(2).
57. See Emmanuel, Independence and Viability: Elements of Analysis, in SIZE,
SELF-DETERMINATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE CARIBBEAN 13-14n.
16 (1976).
58. ANTIGUA CONST., § 63(2); DOMINICA CONST., § 51(6); ST. KITTS CONST., §
50(6); ST. LUCIA CONST., § 51(6)(a); Sr. VINCENT CONST., § 51(6)(a).
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suiting from that election the Premier will not be able to command
the support of a majority of the members of the House. " 59 In nor-
ral circumstances, the removal of the Premier requires that his
ministers also vacate their offices. 60
The Legislature
As with the independent states of the Commonwealth Caribbean,
the constitutions of the Associated States focus on the composition,
powers, privileges and immunities of the central governments of their
unitary states. The sole exception is in the case of St. Kitts/Nevis/
Anguilla, where, as requested at the 1966 conference, 61 recognition
has also been given to the position of "local government" in Nevis
and Anguilla. 62
In terms of the structure of the legislative branch of government,
a significant departure from tradition has occurred with the choice of
a unicameral legislature by all of the Associated States except for An-
tigua and Grenada. At the same time, however, the strong West In-
dian tradition of government by nominated legislators remains evi-
dent. In this regard, the recent Constitutional Commission Report for
Trinidad and Tobago stated that:
There is... a strong tradition of government by nomination, a fear
that the elected person will not be as educated or as intelligent as
the nominated member and consequently will not be as capable of
making decisions for the country.6 3
This tradition of government by nomination is most evident in
Antigua, the only existing Associated State with a bicameral legisla-
ture. The Antiguan Upper House or Senate is composed entirely of
nominated persons. Of its ten members, seven are appointed by the
Governor upon the advice of the Premier, the others being appointed
by the Governor "acting in his discretion after consultation with the
Premier." 64 In Antigua, unlike members of the House of Lords,
59. E.g., ANTIGUA CONST., § 63(3).
60. Id. at § 64(4)(a).
61. See REPORT OF THE ST. KITTS/NEvIS/ANGUILLA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFEHENCE, sunpra note 16, at 9.
62. See ST, KITTS CONST., § 109. See also, the Parliamentary discussion of this
matter, supra note 7, at cols. 409 and 410; Forbes, The Nevis Local Council: A Case
of Formalism in Structural Change, 11 CARIB. STUD. 21 (1971).
63. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO REPORT, supra note 29, at 43. Within the specific
context of the Associated States, see Forbes, Constitutional Arrangements, supra
note 19, at 64-65.
64. ANTIGUA CONST., § 23.
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nominated members don't have any real form of security of tenure.
This is normal in Commonwealth Caribbean states. Although in the
normal course of events they will vacate their seats upon the dissolu-
tion of Parliament, they may be removed from office at any time by
the Governor, who shall act in accordance with the advice of, or as
the case may be, after consultation with, the Premier. 65
In the remaining territories, with the exception of St. Kitts/
Nevis/Anguilla, the one legislative body includes a certain number of
nominated members, usually three. 6 6  In St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla,
when the Attorney General is a nominated member, the total will be
four. 6 7 As with Antigua, the Governor appoints the majority of such
members upon the advice of the Premier;"8 the remainder are ap-
pointed either upon the advice of the Leader of the Opposition 6 9
who, in every territory except Antigua, is given constitutional recog-
nition, 70 or "by the Governor acting in his own deliberate judg-
ment." 71 As in the case of Antigua, security of tenure has not been
a major consideration. A nominated member may, at any time, be
removed from office by the Governor acting upon the advice of the
official upon whose advice such member was appointed in the first
instance. 72  In St. Lucia, however, dismissal in this fashion is not
permitted. The nominated member, except in certain cir-
cumstances, 73 will retain his seat until the occurrence of the first dis-
solution of the House, subsequent to his appointment.74
65. Id. at § 26. It is for this reason that Forbes has stated that '[i]t is within the
absolute will of the Premiers to reduce the Senate to the position of the imitative
monkey of the calypso which docilely does anything at all its master wishes it do."
Forbes, Constitutional Arrangments, supra note 19, at 76.
66. DOMINICA CONST., § 23(I)(b); ST. LUCIA CONST., § 24(1)(b); ST. VINCENT
CONST., § 24(1)(b).
67. ST. KITTS CONST., § 24(2).
68. DOMINICA CONST., § 27; ST. KITTS CONST., § 28; ST. LUCIA CONST., §
28(l)(a); ST. VINCENT CONST., § 28.
69. DOMINICA CONST., § 27; ST. KITTS CONST., § 28; ST. VINCENT CONST., §
28.
70. DOMINICA CONST., § 58; ST. KITTS CONST., § 59; ST. LUCIA CONST., § 60;
ST. VINCENT CONST., § 69.
71. ST. LUCIA CONST., § 28 (1)(b). See also the terms of ST. LUCIA CONST., §
28(2).
72. DOMINICA CONST., § 28(2); ST. KITTS CONST., § 29(2); ST. VINCENT
CONST., § 29(2). Also of interest in this regard is In re Maharaj, [1966] 10 W.I.R.
149.
73. ST. LUCIA CONST., § 29(2)(a), 30.
74. E.g., ST. LUCIA CONST., § 29(1). In addition, the constitutions, as is normal,
establish certain qualifications for membership in both elected and nominated
categories, such as citizenship. They also provide for the disqualification of members
in cases in bankruptcy, insanity, criminal convictions, and so forth.
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Notwithstanding this strong West Indian tradition of government
by nominated legislators, however, in all of the unicameral legisla-
tures, elected members from constituencies represented by one per-
son are dominant. In Antigua, the House of Representatives, an
elected body, is clearly in a position of predominance vis-a-vis the
Senate.
While following the tradition of government by nomination, the
majority of the Associated States have been more innovative with re-
gard to the structure of the government. Aware that their "small-
ness;" and especially their underdevelopment, will mean a scarcity of
adequately trained persons, they have generally chosen to have only
one legislative chamber. It is significant that St. Lucia, which re-
tained the option of creating a second chamber, 75 has resisted such a
move, in spite of the simple constitutional procedure for doing so and
the obvious opportunities for political patronage which such a move
would occasion.
Evidence of these same factors can be seen in the roles given to
the Speaker of the Legislature (or of the House of Representatives, as
in Antigua) and to the Attorney General. Each of the constitutions
empowers the Legislature or Lower House, as the case may be, to
elect a Speaker who is not a legislator, 76 and who "shall be a member
of the House by virtue of holding that office." 77 Barring subsequent
disqualification, the Speaker holds office until the first meeting of the
legislative body taking place after dissolution. In instances where the
Attorney General is a public officer, he shall, by virtue of his office,
be an ex officio member of the House. 78 Additionally, in Antigua, at
the request of the Speaker of the Senate, the Attorney General may
attend its sittings, and take part in the proceedings of the Senate
which relate to the business specified in the request, as if he were a
member of that body. He may not, however, vote in the Senate. 79
Although the constitutions pay some attention to the scope of the
privileges and immunities of the legislative branch of government,8"
75. See ST. LUCIA CONST., Sched. 2, for details of this "'Standby scheme."
76. ANTIGUA CONST., § 34(2); DOMINICA CONST., § 29(2), ST. KITTS CONST.,
§ 30(2); ST. LUCIA CONST., § 31(2); ST. VINCENT CONST., § 30(2).
77. E.g., DoMIINICA CONST., § 29(5)(b).
78. DOMIINICA CONST., § 23(3); ST. KITTS CONST., § 24(4); ST. LUCIA CONST.,
§ 24(3). Much the same result is arrived at in Antigua by virtue of the terms of
ANTIGUA CONST., § 30(3).
79. ANTIGUA CONST., § 29.
80. See, e.g., ANTIGUA CONST., §§ 8(1)-(2), 48, 49, 51; DOwINICA CONsr.,
§§ 8(1), 8(8), 32, 35, 43; ST. KITTS CONST., §§ 8(1), 8(8), 33, 43; ST. LUCIA CONST.,
§§ 8(1), 8(8), 34, 37, 45; ST. VINCENT CONST., §§ 8(1), 8(8), 35, 45, 46.
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these are matters which are primarily regulated by local statute "I and
by the common law.82
Considerable attention is devoted within the constitutions to de-
fining the manner in which the legislature actually functions. Each
legislature is given the authority to make laws for the peace, order,
and good government of the state.83  As with the "pure" Westmin-
ster model, the normal method of expressing the legislative will is
through passage of bills by a simple majority of those legislators pres-
ent and voting, subject only to quorum requirements sA8
In Antigua, like the House of Lords, legislative measures passed
in the appropriate manner by the House of Representatives can be-
come law notwithstanding the absence of a simple majority in the
Senate. The powers of the Senate are essentially those of delay rather
than veto8 5 and are particularly limited with regard to "Money
Bills. " 86
The Amendment Process
Following the general pattern of the constitutions of the "New
Commonwealth," s7 (unlike the position in the United Kingdom), any
legislation designed to amend the basic constitutional instruments of
the Associated States"8 is subject to special procedures. A statement
in the Report of the Constitution Commission of Trinidad and Tobago
illustrates the rationale behind these procedures:
81. For example, in St, Kitts, this would be the Legislative Council (Powers and
Privileges) Act, 1961, c. 167; in St. Vincent, the Legislative Council (Privileges, In-
munities and Powers) Act, Revised Laws, 1966, Title VI, c. 2.
82. See generally Jagan v. Gajraj, [1963] 5 W.I.R. 333..
83. ANTIGUA CONST., § 37; DoM1NICA CONST., § 33; Sr. KITTS CONST., § 34;
ST. LUCIA CONST., § 35; ST. VINCENT CONST., § 36. An authoritative definition of
this termn is to be found in the Trinidad and Tobago case of In re Prakesh Seereeram
(Unreported Court of Appeal decision, Civil Appeals nos. 11, 15) (1975) (Rees, J.A.),
at 13.
84. It is of significance to note that a Speaker who is not otherwise a member of
the House, with the exception of Antigua, has no vote. See DOMINICA CONST., §
39(3); ST. KITTS CONST., § 39(3); ST. LUCIA CONST., § 41(3); ST. VINCENT CONST., §
41(3). For the position in Antigua, see ANTIGUA CONST., § 41(2)-(3).
85. ANTIGUA CONST., § 46.
86. Id. at § 45(1), as defined in § 47. See also ANTIGUA CONST., § 44(2).
87. The term "New Commonwealth" was issued to differentiate the Common-
wealth Third World States from the "'Old Dominions," such as Canada and Australia.
88. In addition to the constitutional text, a certain sanctity is also accorded to
certain provisions of the Orders in Council establishing and regulating the regional
judiciary. See, e.g., ANTIGUA CONST., § 38; DOMINICA CONST., § 34; ST. KITTS
CONST., § 35; ST. LUCIA CONST., § 36; ST. VINCENT CONST., § 37. See also STAT.
INST. 1967, No. 224.
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The rationale would seem to be that in a multiracial society...
there is always likely to be, quite understandably, some mea-
sure of anxiety that the basically agreed constitutional structure
may at some time be radically changed by a narrow majority.
Hence care should be taken to require a broad consensus before an
important alteration can be effected. 8 9
In each of the constitutions, two distinct amending procedures are
outlined, which specifically distinguish those "basic clauses" essential
to "the arrangements for democratic government" from other clauses
of the constitution. 9u InI effect, the instruments provide for two
levels of constitutional entrenchment.
The most essential provisions are enumerated in Schedule 1 of
each of the constitutions. These provisions can be amended only by
way of the same onerous procedures which have been established for
unilateral termination of the status arrangement by the individual As-
sociated States. 9 1 These procedures require a nine-day "cooling
off" period, a two-thirds majority of -all elected members of the legis-
lature, and an affirmative vote by the electorate, equal to two-thirds
of all votes cast in a referendum. 92 In Antigua, because of its bicam-
eral legislature, the process is, in theory at least, even more com-
plex. 93
As to the constitutional sections not included in Schedule 1, the
mechanisms for amendment are more straightforward. 94 In those
territories which have only one chamber, a two-thirds majority of all
of the elected members of that House is required for amending these
"non-basic clauses." 9  In Antigua, a similar two-thirds rule is used
insofar as the lower House is concerned; the upper House, which has
no effective veto power and which, in any event, has a built-in gov-
ernment majority, continues to act only as a potential delay to the
change. 9 6
89. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO REPORT, supra note 29, at 107.
90. CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS, supra note 9, at 3.
91. West Indies Act, 1967, c. 4, at § 10(1), which is to be read in conjunction
with Schedule 2 thereof.
92. DOMINICA CONST., § 34(3); ST. KITTS CONST., § 35(3); ST. LUCIA CONST.,
36(3); ST. VINCENT CONST., § 37(3).
93. ANTIGUA CONST., § 38(4).
94. Measures designed to amend the constitutional position of local government
for Nevis or Anguilla require a rather complex formula; see ST. KITTS CONST., §
35(4).
95. DOMINICA CONST., § 34(2); ST. KITrs CONST., § 35(2); ST. LUCIA CONST., §
36(2); ST. VINCENT CONST., § 37(2).
96. ANTIGUA CONST., §§ 38(2)-(3). In Antigua, the Premier appoints the majority
of the Senate's members.
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As a result of these amending procedures, a certain amount of
the flexibility that characterizes the British constitutional framework 97
is lost. The general view appears to be that, although a degree of
constitutional rigidity results, it "is by no means an unreasonable
price for maintaining public confidence or mutual trust." s98 In fact,
given social and political realities, the degree of difficulty which is
placed in the way of the legislatures, especially with regard to the
"non-basic" sections, may not be great.
An appropriate perspective is provided by Forbes:
[T]he requirements of a two-thirds majority as a precautionary
safeguard against whimsical amendment loses a great deal of the
significance intended by the framers of the constitutions because of
the existence of social structures which facilitate the development
of dominant mass party systems, in which the party leaders are the
central overtopping figures who exercise a close personal control. 99
In addition, section 5(4) of the West Indies Act of 1967 provides an
opportunity to circumvent these mechanisms:
Where the constitution of an associated state provided by a Con-
stitution Order has come into effect, Her Majesty may at any time,
by Order in Council made at the request and with the consent of
that state, alter that constitution or any part of that constitution, or
alter any law which alters that constitution or any part of it.I°°
The legislature of each of the States, by a simple majority of those
present and voting, can request the initiation of this procedure.' 0 '
Although the British authorities have clearly indicated that they will
not feel obliged to comply with such a "request and consent," 102 it is
evident that they would be reluctant to refuse to do so.' 0 3
The Superior Courts
It is within the structure of the Superior Courts that deviation
from constitutional norms is most evident. Of particular interest is the
97. Patchett, English Law in the West Indies, supra note 34, at 923-24.
98. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO REPORT, supra note 29, at 107.
99. Forbes, Constitutional Arrangements, supra note 19, at 78.
100. West Indies Act, 1967, c. 4 § 5(4).
101. Id. at § 19(5).
102. As was stated in the 1965 Constitutional Proposals: "It will be understood that
there will be no obligation on the British Parliament or Her Majesty in Council to
comply with a request from the territory to alter its Constitution." CONSTITUTIONAL
PROPOSALS, supra note 9, at 7.
103. See, e.g., STAT. INST. 1974, No. 197, Sched. 1.
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establishment, under the authority of the West Indies Act, of a com-
mon Supreme Court structure for all the Associated States. 104 This
body is "divided into a High Court and Court of Appeal, with a High
Court judge resident in each State." 105
The creation of such a structure, however, was not revolutionary.
InI fact, it could be described more accurately as the natural out-
growth of the twin forces of tradition and innovative conservatism. It
is traditional in the sense that a system of common courts has been in
existence for these islands since 1859.106 Its structure is really in-
novative only in that, by the exercise of its jurisdiction over Montser-
rat and the British Virgin Islands, 1 0 7 the system applies simultane-
ously to entities with differing forms of constitutional status. 1" 8
An Imperial Order in Council created the common Supreme
Court and established the basis for its jurisdiction. 1 9  It provides
that within each territory, the divisions of the Court shall have such
jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred on them by the Con-
stitution or any other law of the State. In addition, the Order pro-
vides that "the process of the Supreme Court shall run throughout
the States and any judgment of the Court shall have full force and
effect and may be executed and enforced in any of the States."110
The Constitutions have, by specific provisions, granted to this body
extensive jurisdictional powers in relation to such matters as constitu-
tional interpretation, fundamental rights, and membership of Parlia-
ment."1 '
Although it is true that "[t]he constitutions do not anywhere
explicitly give the Supreme Court jurisdiction to review substantive
legislation and to pronounce upon the vires of such legislation," 112 it
104. West Indies Act, 1967, c. 4, § 6(1); STAT. INST. 1967, No. 223.
105. 1967 ANNUAL SURVEY OF COMMONWEALTH LAW 11 (1968).
106. See Laing, Crown Indivisibility, Governmental Liability and Other Problems
in the West Indies Associated States, 23 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 127, 128-29 (1974).
107. See STAT. INST. 1967, No. 223; STAT. INST. 1967, No. 234. Such an
arrangement was specifically authorized by the West Indies Act, 1967, c. 4. See also
STAT. INST., supra note 103, at § 10.
108. The British Virgin Islands and Montserrat are Crown Colonies. It is of in-
terest to note that, subsequent to its independence, Grenada has continued to make
use of this court structure.
109. STAT. INST. 1967, supra note 103, at § 9, See also, The West Indies As-
sociated States Supreme Court Agreement (February 24, 1967) (unpublished).
110. STAT. INST., 1967, supra note 103, at § 9(3).
111. See ANTIGUA CONST., §§ 51, 55, 102-104; DoMINICA CONST., §§ 16, 32,
96-98; ST. KITTS CONST., §§ 16, 33, 98-100; ST. LUCIA CONST., §§ 16, 34, 96-98;
ST. VINCENT CONST., §§ 16, 35, 99-]01.
112. Forbes, Constitutional Arrangements, supra note 19, at 82.
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is generally agreed that there is now no doubt that the power of
judicial review arises from the constitutional instruments, as it does in
the independent Commonwealth states of the region, by necessary
intendment. 113 The Supreme Court, it should be stressed, has on a
number of occasions acted under this assumption, 114 and the Privy
Council has done likewise."'
By virtue of this power, the Courts are empowered, and indeed
obliged, to void pro tanto 116 such legislative enactments as conflict
with the specific or implied provisions of the constitutions. 117 As the
late West Indian jurist Sir Hugh Wooding stated in the analogous
case of Trinidad and Tobago, "I am... in no doubt that our Supreme
Court has been constituted, and is, the guardian of the Constitu-
tion." 118
The powers of a common Supreme Court have important politi-
cal ramifications. First, judicial review, in effect, imparts to the
superior courts a political role in the process of positive government.
Second, by the process of constitutional interpretation, the courts, in
effect, mold the substance of the constitutional document, and hence
political life itself. Since constitutional law is primarily political theory
expressed in legal language, the members of the bench, in reaching
113. On the position in the independent states, see Carnegie, Judicial Review of
Legislation in the Ivest Indian Constitutions, 1971 PuB. L. 276. Such a capacity,
when viewed within a historical colonial context, cannot be viewed as revolutionar,
in spite of the major deviation from the pure Westminster model. See Alexis, The
Basis of Judicial Review of Legislation in the New Commonwealth and the United
States of America, 7 LAw. Axi. 567, 588-89 (1975). See generally Forbes, Constitu-
tional Arrangemnents, supra note 19, at 89; PHILLIPS, supra note 20, at c. X.
114. The existence of the power of judicial review of legislation had been taken for
granted and been exercised to strike down the Public Meetings and Processions
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1967, as being inconsistent with the rights guaranteed by
sections 10 and 11 of the Constitution of that state to freedom of expression, and of
association and assembly, respectively, in Chief of Police v. Powell, [1968] 12 W.I I.
403; see also Charles v. Phillips, [1966-67) 10 W.I.R. 435, where the Court of Appeal
of the Associated States struck down an Imperial Order in Council, the Leeward
Islands (Emaergency Provisions) Order in Council 1959, as being unconstitutional. A
challenge failed on the facts in Francis v. Chief of Police, [19701 15 W.I.R. 1.
115. Although not yet used to strike down a legislative enactment, the judgment
in Attorney Gen. v. Antigua Times Ltd., [19751 3 All E.R. 81 must he regarded as
having implicitly accepted the doctrine.
116. In this sense, pro tanto means void to the extent of the inconsistency but not
otherwise. It is, however, possible for an enactment to be void in toto under a pro
tanto provision if the part deemed unconstitutional is so fundamental to the legisla-
tion that it cannot be meaningfully severed from the rest.
117. For the importance of implied terms see Hinds v, The Queen, supra note 28,
1 All E.R. at 359 (Lord Diplock).
118. Collymore v. Attorney Gen., [19671 12 W.IIR. 5, 9.
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their decision, perforce, manipulate juristic theories of politics. As a
consequence, these constitutions have apparently by design, 119 made
the judges principal holders of political power. 1 20
Her Majesty's Privy Council has been retained as the final court
of appeal in all important constitutional matters. 121 This provision
was not unusual in the Commonwealth Caribbean, and only Guyana,
among the independent states, has seen fit to terminate its involve-
ment with this essentially external judicial body.122 The same course
of action, however, has been recommended for Trinidad and To-
bago. 123
The retention of the Privy Council raises serious problems. It is
an example of "mechanical jurisprudence," 124 which ignores the
unique factors in the process of constitutional adjudication. 1 25
Without substantial exposure to such factors as the customs, tra-
ditions, socio-econonic circumstances, and political conditions of the
territories in question, many believe the Privy Council cannot hope
to channel the evolution of these constitutional structures in a way
which is socially appropriate.12 6  The Privy Council will, by and
large, be unaware of local conditions. 1 27
119. See CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS, supra note 9, at 4, 8-9, and WINDWARD
ISLANDS CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 5, at 14.
120. See generally Gilmore, Towards the Demystification of the Processes of Con-
stitutional Adjudication in the Independent West Indian States, in CURRENT ISSUES
IN WEST INDIAN LAW (forthcoming publication).
121. ANTIGUA CONST., § 105; DOMINICA CONST., § 99; ST. KiTrs CONST., § 11 101;
ST. LUCIA CONST., § 99; ST. VINCENT CONST., § 102.
122. See generally the Republican Constitution of 1970 and Act No. 7 of 1973.
123. See TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO REPORT, supra note 29, at 85-88. For a variety of
reasons, such a suggestion does not find reflection in the new Republican Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Act No. 4 of 1976. See also Constitu-
tional Reform: Speech by the Prime Minister in the House of Representatives (1975).
124. See Gilmore, supra note 120, at Parts II & III.
125. Id.
126. In the analogous case of the independent states, Patchett has lnade the fol-
lowing remarks:
Again, it may be asked whether the Judicial Committee should retain
this power after independence. For independence bears with it responsi-
bility for one's own development. Although the Judicial Committee repre-
sents impartiality and objectivity, many of the constitutional issues turn
upon concepts, such as equality and reasonableness, which should be
applied not abstractly but by those who are aware of their meaning and
effect in a particular society. If the judiciary is to be required to decide
these issues, it is as much an instrument for the development of the soci-.
etv as the executive.
Patchett, English Law in the West Indies, supra note 34, at 929.
127. This has been made evident in a recent decision of that body on appeal from
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The Privy Council has traditionally relied heavily on the House
of Lords for its members. "Accordingly, from the standpoint of juridi-
cal philosophy and principles, [it] is heavily influenced by British
common law."128 In this context, it is significant that the late Sir
Hugh Wooding has been the only West Indian, at least in modern
times, to sit in active adjudication on that bench, and then only in
one instance. 129
Serious questions therefore arise, as to the extent of the political
maintenance capability 130 of the Associated States. "Particular politi-
cal structures live or die according to whether they can remain com-
patible with their cultural and natural environment; whether by mak-
ing themselves suitable to it or by modifying it to suit them." 131 It
remains to be seen whether the Privy Council can aid them to do
either.
It should be noted that the constitutions all seek to limit the
review powers of the courts. Two types of mechanisms have been
commonly used in the West Indian constitutions to do so. First, in
the independence constitutions, a "savings clause" has been inserted
which seeks to protect pre-existing law from constitutional chal-
lenge. 1 32 As will be shown below, such provisions have no counter-
part in the constitutions of the Associated States. Second, a fairly
large number of "non-justiciability" provisions have been included
within the constitutional texts of both status groups.
The purpose of these provisions is to place certain of the ac-
tivities of specified persons or bodies beyond the purview of the
courts. Section 114 of the Antigua Constitution is a good illustration
of the general approach taken:
When by this Constitution the Governor is required to perform
any function in accordance with the advice of, or after consultation
Jamaica. Lord Diplock, in rendering the judgment of the majority stated as follows:
No evidence has been adduced by the appellants in the instant case to
rebut the presumption as respects the interests of public safety and public
order. Unlike the judges of the Court of Appeal, their Lordships have no
personal knowledge of public safety and public order. Unlike the judges of
the Court of Appeal, their Lordships have no personal knowledge of the
circumstances in Jamaica which gave rise to the passing of the 1974 Act.
Hinds v. The Queen, 1 All E.R. at 369.
128. Forbes, Constitutional Arrangements, supra note 19, at 82.
129. The case was Lau Liat Meng v. Disciplinary Committee, [1968] A.C. 391.
130. Political "imaintenance" capability is the process by which a structure adjusts
itself to changes in the environment or modifies the environment to suit itself.
131. F. BAILEY, STRATAGEMS AND SPOILS 10 (1969).
132. JAMAICA CONST., § 26; BARBADOS CONST., § 26; GUYANA CONST., § 18;
TRINIDAD AND TOBACO CONST., § 3; supra note 21.
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with, the Cabinet or any Minister, the question whether the Gov-
ernor has acted in accordance with such advice, or whether such
consultation has taken place, shall not be enquired into in any
court of law.1 3
3
Although this author has been unable to locate specific decisions
from the Associated States Supreme Court, or judgments from the
Privy Council arising from an appeal from that Court, it is possible to
speculate, with some degree of certainty, as to what the attitude to
such provisions is likely to be, because, here, as in many matters, the
general approach of West Indian and British jurists coincide. 134
The approach of the West Indian courts is to take an extreme
distaste for provisions, whether statutory or constitutional, which seek
to deny their jurisdiction. For example, in the leading Trinidad and
Tobago case in this area, In re Maharaj,13 5 the bench decided the
issue at hand on strict procedural criteria without mentioning the see-
tion of the constitution which purported to exclude its jurisdiction. A
similar approach has been adopted by the courts in the several cases
which have arisen since independence in the Co-Operative Republic
of Guyana.' 36 In essence, they have sought to "minimize" the effect
of such attempts to oust their jurisdiction, thereby "maximizing" the
boundaries of their "guardianship."
In proceeding in this fashion, they may be regarded as continu-
ing a British judicial tradition which dates back to Smith's Case in
1670.137 As H.W.R. Wade has stated in his analysis of the House of
Lords decision in Anisimic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commis-
sion:
For three centuries... the courts have been refusing to enforce
statutes which attempt to give public authorities uncontrollable
powers .... In effect they have established a kind of entrenched
provision which the legislature, whatever it says, is compelled to
respect. 138
133. In addition, see the following constitutional provisions: ANTIGUA CONST., 
20(2), 38(7)(b), 47(4), 59(5); DOMINICA CONST., §§ 21(2), 34(7)(b), 49(7), 107; ST,
KITTS CONST., §§ 22(2), 35(8)(b), 48(7), 112; ST. LUCIA CONST., §§ 22(2), 36(8)(b),
49(11), 107; ST. VINCENT CONST., §§ 22(2), 37(8)(b), 111.
134. See generally TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO REPORT, supra note 29, at 85-86.
135. [19661 10 W.I.R. 149.
136. See C. OKPALUBA, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION IN
GUYANA (1972),
137. [1670] 86 Eng. Rep. 46.
138. Wade, Constitutional and Administratitu Aspects of the Anisimic Case, 85
L.Q. REv. 198, 200 (1969).
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Separation of Powers and Zones of Neutrality
The interrelationships between the three central branches of
government of the Associated States are limited by the doctrine of
the separation of powers,' 3 9 the existence of which is essential in a
modern democratic state. 1 40  In Hinds v. The Queen, Lord Diplock
stated that even without an express statement of the doctrine in these
constitutions, it "is left to necessary implication from the adoption in
the new constitution of a governmental structure, which makes provi-
sions for a legislature, an executive and a judicature. It is taken for
granted that the basic principle of separation of powers will apply to
the exercise of their respective functions by these three organs of
government." 141
In the Associated States' constitutions, however, the separation is
not a complete one. For example, the ministers of the Cabinet are
also members of the legislative branch. It is equally evident that in
States which have adopted the Westminster model of parliamentary
democracy, the form of the separation of powers doctrine intended is
that which has "been developed in the unwritten constitution of the
United Kingdom." 142 Given the influence of the British system, it is
not surprising to find that, insofar as their specific terms are con-
cerned, the constitutions pay particular attention to the position of
the Superior Courts. Thus, it is deeply entrenched in each constitu-
tion that all civil and criminal matters be tried by "an independent
and impartial" body established by law. 143 In addition, all of the
provisions of the Imperial Order in Council designed to protect the
independence of the judiciary are similarly entrenched in the con-
stitutions. 144
139. The "pure" form of this doctrine, as first expounded by Aristotle and sub-
sequently refined by Locke and Montesquieu has been defined in the following
terms:
Each branch of government must be confined to the exercise of its own
function and not allowed to encroach upon the functions of the other
branches. Furthermore, the persons who compose these three agencies of
government must be kept separate and distinct, no individual being al-
lowed to be at the samie tine a member of more than one branch. In this
way each of the branches will be a check to the other and no single group
of people will be able to control the machinery of the state.
VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 13 (1967).
140. Id. at 16.
141. Hinds v. The'Queen, I All E.R. at 359.
142. Id.
143. ANTIGUA CONST., §§ 8(1)-(2); DO.,tINICA CONST., §§ 8(1)-(2); ST. KITTS
CONST., §§ 8(1)-(2); ST. LUCIA CONST., §§ 8(1)-(2); ST. VINCENT CONST., §§ 8(1)-(2).
144. It should be noted that certain of the constitutions specifically disqualifl Su-
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The obvious intention of these provisions is to remove the con-
duct of judicial affairs from political interference or coercion, whether
direct or indirect. 1 45 All judges, with the exception of the Chief Jus-
tice, are to be appointed by a Judicial and Legal Services Commis-
sion. 146 They are to hold office until the age of sixty-five in the case
of members of the Court of Appeal, or sixty-two for Puisne Judges
and:
Provided that the Judicial and Legal Services Commission acting
with the concurrence of the Premiers of all the States may permit a
judge to continue in his office after attaining the age pre-
scribed. fr a period or periods not exceeding in aggregate three
years. 147
During his tenure of office, "the salary and allowances.. of a
judge shall not be reduced and the terms and conditions of office
applicable to a judge upon his appointment shall not be made less
favorable to him during the currency of that appointment." 148 Fi-
nally, security of tenure is guaranteed, and a judge can only be re-
moved from office for an inability to discharge his functions or for
misbehaviour.149
The existence of such grounds for removal is determined by a
highly complex procedure in which the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council makes the final decision. 150
The significance of such provisions to the overall scheme of the
separation of powers is undeniable.151 These provisions, however,
are also symptomatic of a more general, desire to insulate "sensitive
areas of public activity from direct political influence." 152 The
Courts, therefore, are but one of the "politically neutral zones" created
by these constitutions.
As in the constitutions of the independent states of the region,
certain provisions of the Associated States' constitutions focus on the
preme Court Judges from membership of the legislature; see ANTIGUA CONST.,
2 5(l)(g), 3 2 (i)(g); and ST. VINCENT CONST., § 26(1)(c).
145. See Patchett, English Law in The West Indies, supra note 34, at 928.
146. See STAT. IN'ST., supra note 104, at § 5. Membership of the Judicial and
Legal Services Commission is organized in such a way as to minimize the possibility
of the use of political influence; see STAT. INST., supra note 104, at §§ 18, 19.
147. Id. at § 8(1).
148. Id. at § 11(1)(b).
149. Id. at § 8(3).
150. Id. at §§ 8(4)-(9). This formula has been the subject of criticism by Patchett,
among others; see Patchett, English Lw in The West Indies, supra note 34, at 929.
151. See generally Hinds v. The Queen, I All E.R. at 353.
152. S.A. DE SMITH, supra note 35, at 136.
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position of the civil service and the police 153 in an attempt "to secure
the careers of members of these services from the control of future
political leaders." 154
The mechanism used to achieve this goal has been the creation
of a number of autonomous agencies in each of the territories: a Pub-
lic Service Commission, a Police Service Commission, and a Public
Service Board of Appeal. The use of such bodies is by no means
novel, and has its origins not only in the organization of the Colonial
Service, but also in domestic British practice. The purpose of this
system was to curb "[tlhe notorious effects of party patronage on the
public service [which] had been criticized in the still influential
1855 Northcote-Trevelyan Report. This Report led to reforms which
eventually resulted in the establishment of a Civil Service Commis-
sion which preserves the British public from unfit appointees.'" 155 In
essence, the constitutional provisions in question seek to do no more
than that.
Following the precedent established in the drafting of the
Jamaican Constitution, attempts have been made "to safeguard the
stream of criminal justice from being polluted by the inflow of nox-
ious political contamination." 56 Thus, in instances where the Attor-
ney General is a political figure, a Director of Public Prosecutions is
to be appointed who (unlike his counterpart in England) is to be
given a separate constitutional status and is to be free of the direc-
tions of the Attorney General in carrying out his tasks.15 7
At the 1966 Constitutional Conferences, it was agreed that "[a]t
any time when the Attorney General is a civil servant the powers of
the Director in relation to criminal prosecutions may be exercised by
153. See ANTIGUA CONST., c. VI, §§ 71, 72, 79, 80; DOMINICA CONST., C. VI, §§
60, 61, 63, 64, 73, 75; ST. KITTS CO ST., c. VI, §§ 60, 61, 64, 73, 75; ST. LUCIA
CONST., c. VI, §§ 61, 62, 64, 73, 75; ST. VINCENT CONST., C. VI, §§ 60, 61, 63, 64,
73, 75.
154. Collins, Some Notes on Public Service Commissions in the Commonwealth
Caribbean, in THE AFTERMATH OF SOVEREIGNTY: WEST INDIAN PERSPECTIVES 94.
In a somewhat bolder manner, Forbes has written:
[T]he Public Service Commission is the agency relied upon to offset the
grosser forms of nepotism and to promote recruitment practices based
upon universalistic standards of achievement and thereby help to create an
efficient bureaucracy which is a useful prop supporting the ideals of the
constitutions.
Forbes, Constitutional Arrangements, supra note 19, at 73.
155. Forbes, Constitutional Arranagements, supra note 19, at 96.
156. S. A. DE SMITH, supra note 35, at 144.
157. ANTIGUA CONST., § 72; DOMINICA CONST., § 64; ST. KITTS CONST., § 64;
ST. LUCIA CONST., § 64; ST. VINCENT CONST., § 64.
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the Attorney General and it will not be necessary for there to be a
separate holder of the Office of Director of Public Prosecution." 158
Although the basic intent of these schemes is to insulate the
persons or bodies in question from political influence, there are cer-
tain exceptions. The most important of these relates to the appoint-
ment of the Chief Justice of the regional Supreme Court. As set out
in the West Indies Associated States Supreme Court Order of 1967,
that office is to be filled by Her Majesty, acting upon the advice of
the appropriate British minister, by way of Letters Patent.
159
At the 1966 Constitutional Conferences, however, certain "under-
standings" were reached as to the procedures which would be fol-
lowed pursuant to this provision. These were, in turn, set out in dis-
patches to the island administrators prior to the entry into force of
the new status arrangement. They state that:
(a) [T]he Minister of Her Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom who will advise Her Majesty will be the Lord High
Chancellor of England;
(b) before tendering advice to Her Majesty the Lord Chancellor
will consult the Premier of each of the Associated States in which
the Supreme Court has jurisdiction. 160
Although the room for direct political influence in such appoint-
ments was greatly minimized by the role of the Lord Chancellor,
subsequent practice has indicated the weakness of the scheme,' 6 1 and
hence the importance of the politically neutral zones which have been
created.
158. REPORT OF THE ST. KITTs/NEvIs/ANGUILLA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE,
supra note 16, at 17. This agreed course of action is reflected in the terms of AN-
TIGUA CONST., § 71(4); DOMINICA CONST., § 63(4); ST. KITTs CONST., § 63(4); ST.
VINCENT CONST., § 63(5). The position of St. Lucia is somewhat different in that its
constitution envisages the eventual creation of both offices on a permanent basis with
the Attorney General always a political figure; see WINDWARD ISLANDS CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 5, at 33. This is clearly reflected in ST. LUCIA
CONST., § 52. But see the transitional provision, ST. LUCIA CONST., § 104.
159. STAT. INST. 1967, No. 223, § 5(1).
160. See Commonwealth Office Grenada Dispatch No. 84 of 22 February 1967 (H.
Bowden to 1. G. Turbott, Administrator) (unpublished). Terms agreed to in Gre-
nada Dispatch No. 59 of 23 February 1967 (I. C. Turbott to H. Bowden) (unpub-
lished).
161. This is well illustrated in the context of the nomination of Mr. P. T. Georges,
a native of Dominica and former Chief Justice of Tanzania, to fill that post. In spite of
a broad based support for his candidacy, the opposition of one of the island leaders,
who favored another local jurist, blocked his appointment, and the position was even-
tually filled by a candidate generally believed to be less qualified to hold office,
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III. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION
Historical Evolution
Since the incorporation of fundamental rights provisions into the
body of the constitutional structure constitutes a major departure
from British legal orthodoxy,162 it is of value to trace the historical
reasons for this change and to note the sources of the provisions
which have been adopted.
Until 1959, there was no comprehensive treatment of the human
rights issue within the constitutional frameworks of the United King-
dor or its colonial territories. The reasons for this is the Benthamite
tradition 163 of British jurisprudence, which is well summarized by de
Smith as follows:
The English lawyer finds political manifestoes out of place in a
legal document, particularly when their philosophical foundations
are insecure. He instinctively prefers brass tacks to noble phrases,
pragmatism to metaphysics, and obstinately insists that the proof of
the pudding is in the eating. Nor is he in the least impressed by
the history of liberty in the majority of countries which have had
constitutional declarations or guarantees of rights. Above all, there
is a natural tendency to feel that lessons drawn from one's own
experience have universal validity. 64
The first major break with this Benthamite tradition came with
the formulation of the Nigerian Independence Constitution of
1959.165 It is evident that the decision to incorporate fundamental
rights provisions arose from the nature of the local political situation
in which certain minority groups feared for their future. 166
The rights which were agreed upon were brought into force prior
to the date of independence. As Elias explained: "[t]he provisions
were introduced just before the federal elections of December 12,
162. This is not an appropriate forum to trace the coitroversy regardiing the need
for a U. K. Bill of Rights. See A Bill of Rights for Britain?, 3 "COMNIIONVEALTH L.
BULL. 503 (1977).
163. Bentham once wrote of such provisions, "'look to the letter, you find
nonsense -look beyond the letter, vou find nothing." De Smith, Fundamental Rights
in the New Commonawealth, 10 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 83, 84 (1961).
164. Id. at 86.
165. STAT, INST. 1960, No. 1652.
166. See De Smith, Fundamental Rights in the New Conmmonwealth, supra note
163, at 215-16; T. 0. ELIAS, NICERIA: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAW AND CON-
STITUTION 141-43 (1967).
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1959. This was at the insistence of some of the Nigerian leaders who
apparently believed that they would be enabled thereby to campaign
without let or hindrance, particularly in the Northern Region."167
The Nigerian solution was to create a precedent of constitutional
decolonization within the "Empire." In 1960, the same route was
taken in relation to the constitutional proposals for Sierra Leone,
Kenya, and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 16 8 and in
1961, for British Guiana. 16
9
The practice, then, had been in existence for some time when
the discussions were opened in 1961 on the formulation of the
Jamaican fundamental law. There was, however, little enthusiasm
among the political leaders of the island for the inclusion of such pro-
visions in their independence constitution:
The real impetus came from the clamant demands of the capitalist
interests whose predominant advocacy was for the protection of
property rights. The call for constitutional guarantees of human
rights also received support from academic and middle class ele-
ments who probably apprehended future intrusion on the freedoms
of conscience and expression. In the result, a Chapter on Funda-
mental Rights and Freedoms was inserted in the Jamaican Con-
stitution. 170
After the decision had been made to include specific fundamental
rights within the Constitution, there arose "considerable disagree-
ment . . . on the status and force of these provisions."171 Some of
the drafters preferred to place minimum constraints on parliament's
powers, while others sought to entrench such rights. In the end, a
compromise was reached whereby the provisions were to be en-
trenched within the constitutional document, but a clause would be
inserted limiting their scope by "saving" existing laws from constitu-
tional challenge. 172
In its final form, Chapter III of the Jamaican Constitution closely
followed, both in formulation and content, 173 the example of the
Nigerian Constitution.
167. ELIAS, NIGERIA, supra note 166, at 141.
168. See De Smith, Fundamental Rights in the New Commonwealth, supra note
163, at 83-84.
169. See Patchett, English Law in the West Indies, supra note 34, at 924.
170. Barnett, The Constitution: Ten Years After, 1972 JAMAICA L.J. 49, 54 (1972).
171. Munroe, supra note 32, at 64.
172. See MUNROE, supra note 35, at 159.
173. See S. A. DE SMITH, supra note 35, at 193.
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Shortly thereafter, the decision was made to insert similar pro-
tections into the independence instruments for Trinidad and Tobago.
The original draft closely followed the Nigerian/Jamaican formula,
with each individual right and its limitations, best classified as "Bills
of Exceptions" rather than as "Bills of Rights," set out in consider-
able detail.
The Trinidad and Tobago Bar Association objected to this for-
mula and insisted "that the fundamental rights and freedoms should
be briefly and simply stated." 174 Their view eventually prevailed.
The final document closely resembles the Canadian Bill of Rights,
although it should be stressed that the actual interpretation of such
guarantees is significantly different. 175
Four years later, however, at the independence conferences for
Barbados and Guyana, the influence of the Nigerian/Jamaican formula
was again evident. Both states eventually decided in favor of the "Bill
of Exceptions" method of protecting fundamental rights and free-
doms. 176
The Associated States have followed the general trend. The provi-
sions adopted in their constitutions closely parallel and freely borrow
from the Nigerian/Jamaican formula. The origins of these individual
rights provisions are essentially European. Chief Justice Elias as-
serted that the Nigerian formulation was based on the provisions of
the European Convention on Human Rights. 17 7
174. REPORT OF THE TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO CONSTITUTION COMMISSION, supra
note 29, at 18.
175. See S. A. DE SMITH, supra note 35, at 193.
176. It appears that the Trinidad Formula was not seriously considered by Barbados
or Guyana.
177. See ELIAS, NIGERIA, supra note 166, at 142. Chief Awolowo, on the other
hand, argued that the source of such provisions was the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights. See 0. AwoLowo, THOUGHTS ON NIGERIAN CONSTITUTION 120
(1966). It would seem, however, that both views are correct since the former is based
substantially on the latter. See, e.g., L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1002 (1973). This view was expressed by Lord
Fraser of Tulleybelton:
The arrangement and wording of the chapter evidently owe much to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms signed by certain members of the Council for Europe in
1950. The European Convention was itself largely based on the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General As-
sembly.
Attorney Gen. v. Antigua Times Ltd., [1975] 3 All E.R. 81, 84 (Lord Fraser of Tul-
leybelton). Similarly, it should be noted that the Trinidad provisions owe much to the
Universal Declaration; see, e.g., THINKING THINGS THROUGH 5 (Constitution Com-
mission of Trinidad and Tobago, 1972).
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As a consequence of their origins, the constitutional provisions
focus on individual rights, liberties, and immunities, but say nothing
as to individual duties, or social, cultural, or economic matters. For
example, within the Jamaican context, it has been said that
The fundamental rights provisions seek to express the Rule of Law
in the merely negative form which is usually associated with
nineteenth century liberalism, and therefore protects the individual
aganist arbitrary government but does nothing to protect him from
many insidious forms of oppression or to encourage or stimulate his
material or moral advancement.17
8
This does not suggest, however, that these constitutional sections
are an exact reflection of the European Convention. On the contrary,
there are marked differences in approach and wording in several
areas.
Perhaps the most important of these differences is to be found in
the sphere of the protection given to property rights. Here the di-
vergence in treatment first appears with the formulation of the Nige-
rian provisions. As de Smith has noted, the European model
affords private property only ambivalent and half-hearted
safeguards, but the [Nigerian] Constitution requires adequate coin-
pensation to be provided by law in respect of compulsory expropri-
ation, specifies in detail the classes of laws that fall outside the
scope of this guarantee, and gives jurisdiction to the High Courts
to determine the right to compensation.
179
The Nigerian property provision and the subsequent schemes based
on it, however, follow the European experience to the extent that the
protection provided is deemed to be applicable to artificial or legal
persons (such as companies), as well as to natural persons. 18o
Within the Jamaican context, the question was raised as to
whether or not such a subject matter was suitable for inclusion within
the constitutional text; considerable debate produced a fundamental
divergence of opinions. Substantial pressure was brought to bear by
local businessmen, landowners, and foreign investors, and seemingly,
as a consequence of their intervention, the decision was eventually
178. MUNROE, supra note 35, at 159. This approach has been widely criticized;
see, e.g., Georges, Commentary, in INDEPENDENCE FOR GRENADA, su1pra note 6, at
91, 92. See generally, Roberts-Wray, Human Rights in the Commonwealth, 17 INT'L
& CoMp. L.Q. 908 (1968).
179. De Smith, Fundamental Rights in the New Commonwealth, supra note 163,
at 221. See also ELIAS, supra note 166, at 155-56.
180. See Attorney Gen. v. Antigua Times Ltd., 3 All E.R. at 84.
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made to follow the Nigerian precedent.' 8 ' The Jamaican wording is
somewhat different in its final form, however, calling for the payment
of "compensation" as opposed to the "adequate compensation" for-
mula used in Nigeria. 1 82
The Barbadian draft article on this subject, which was based on
the Jamaican text, also generated considerable debate at the 1966
Constitutional Conference. The official report states:
The Barbados National Party proposed that the Constitution should
expressly require the prompt payment of adequate and fair com-
pensation for any property compulsorily acquired under the law
instead of providing that the principles on which and the manner
in which compensation should be determined and given should be
prescribed by law.18 3
The Chairman of the Constitutional Conference noted that precedent
existed for the form in which the article appeared and ruled that the
draft wording, which was supported by the then governing party,
should stand. That decision is now reflected in section 16(1) of the
Constitution.
There was no major objection to including a property clause in
each of the Associated States constitutions. In terms of the degree of
protection to be afforded, however, three differing methods were
adopted. Antigua' 84 and St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla' 8 opted for the
Jamaica/Barbados approach. Dominica requested the insertion of a
provision calling for the payment of "adequate compensation" within
"a reasonable time." 186 St. Lucia and St. Vincent went even further
and included a requirement for the "prompt payment of full compen-
sation." 187
In view of their European origins, it is appropriate to conclude
by stressing that these protection provisions "express the assumptions
of political liberalism; but on matters of economic and social policy
they are ideologically neutral, except insofar as they safeguard exist-
ing property rights against confiscation. "188
181. See MUNROE, supra note 35, at 159-62
182 See § 18(1) of the Jamaican Constitution, supra note 21 and ELIAS, supra note
166, at 155.
183. REPORT OF THE BARBADOS CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at
5.
184. ANTIGUA CONST., § 6.
185. ST. KITTS CONST., § 6.
186. DOMINICA CONST., §6.
187. ST. LUCIA CONST., § 6; ST. VINCENT CONST., § 6.
188. S. A. DE SHTH, supra note 35, at 185. Dominica is in a rather unique
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The Nature of the Protection Afforded
Chapter I of each of the constitutions in question seeks to pro-
vide protection of fundamental rights and freedoms in the following
spheres: life; liberty; security of the person; freedom of conscience, of
expression, of assembly and association; freedom from discrimination
and slavery; protection for privacy, and from deprivation of property
without compensation. 189 The right to vote is not included any-
where in the Constitutions. i s °
Section 1 of each of these constitutions makes it clear that the
enjoyment of the above is subject "to respect for the rights and free-
dons of others and for the public interest."191 The philosophy be-
hind this approach is reflected-in the statement by Patanjali Sastri in
A.I. Gopalan v. State of Madras:
Man, as a rational being, desires to do many things, but in a civil
society his desires have to be controlled, regulated and reconciled
with the exercise of similar desires by other individuals. Liberty
has, therefore, to be limited in order to be effectively possessed.
192
position in this regard in that her constitution alone has a preamble which reads as
follows:
WHEREAS the People of Dominica-(a) have affirmed that the state
of Dominica is founded upon principles that acknowledge the supremacy
of God, faith in fundamental human rights and freedoms, the position of
the family in a society of free men and free institutions, the dignity of the
human person, and the equal and inalienable rights with which all mem-
bers of the family are endowed by their Creator; (b) respect the principles
of social justice and therefore believe that the operation of the economic
system should result in the material resources of the community being so
distributed as to subserve the common good, that there should be
adequate means or livelihood for all, that labour should not be exploited or
forced by economic necessity to operate in inhumane conditions but that
there should be opportunity for advancement on the basis of recognition of
merit, ability and integrity; (c) have asserted their belief in a democratic
society in which all persons may, to the extent of their capacity, play some
part in the institutions of the national life and thus develop and maintain
due respect for lawfully constituted authority; (d) recognize that men and
institutions remain free only when freedom is founded upon respect for
moral and spiritual values and the rule of law; (e) desire that their Con-
stitution should make provision for ensuring the protection in Dominica of
fundamental human rights and freedoms; NOW, THEREFORE, the fol-
lowing provisions shall have effect as the Constitution of Dominica.
189. See generally ANTIGUA CONsT., §§ 1-16; DOMINICA CONST., §§ 1-17; ST.
KITTS CONsT., §§ 1-18; ST. LUCIA CONST., §§ 1-18; ST. VINCENT CONST., §§ 1-18.
190. This exclusion follows the pattern set elsewhere in the West Indies; see
Thompson v. Forrest, [1967] 11 W.I.R. 296.
191. ANTIGUA CONST., § 1; DOMINICA CONST., § 1; ST. KITTS CONST., § 1; ST.
LUCIA CONST., § 1; ST. VINCENT CONST., § 1. This provision codifies the ancient
maxim salus populi supremea-the safety of the people is the highest law.
192. [1950] S.C.R. 88, 190-91.
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The legislature is given a substantial role as the custodian of the pub-
lic trust.
The fundamental rights provisions, which are non-retroactive in
nature,'93 commence with an introductory section which has been the
source of some judicial debate: "[Wjhereas every person... is entitled
to the fundamental rights and freedoms." 194 The use of such
phraseology has led some to argue that the provisions of the constitu-
tions are no more than a codification of pre-existing common law pro-
tections.
While this proposition may be valid with respect to the indepen-
dent Commonwealth Caribbean states, 1 95 it does not seem to be true
in the contemporary constitutional law of the Associated States. Jus-
tice Glasgow stated in relation to section 1 of the Constitution of St.
Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla that "[i]t is true that persons in the State enjoyed
certain rights and liberties before the Constitution came into force,
but those rights and liberties existed only at common law, and were
not necessarily the same as those guaranteed by the constitution." 196
Moreover, although "many [of the Constitutional rights] appear to
state well recognized rules developed at common law," 197 others
"had only a very dubious existence prior to the commencement of
these Constitutions." 98 The accepted view is that the section in
question "is an introduction to and in a sense a prefatory or explana-
tory note in regard to the sections which are to follow." 199 It is not,
however, to be regarded as the "master section" of the Chapter, as
the "nature and extent of the rights and freedoms protected... de-
pend on the provisions of the sections respectively protecting
them." 200
Within the rights themselves, there exists an implied classi-
fication or grouping. On the one hand, there are those rights which
are absolute in the sense that they permit no derogation except by
way of formal constitutional amendment. This grouping is limited to
193. See Chief of Police v. Powell, [1967] 12 W.I.R. at 416.
194. ANTICUA CONST., § 1; DoMNNICA CONST., § 1; ST. KITTS CONST., § 1; ST.
LUCIA CONST., § 1; ST. VINCENT CONST., § 1.
195. Alexis, After Thornhill, 1977 WEST INDIAN LJ. 24 (1977).
196. Chief of Police v. Powell, 12 W.I.R. at 415.
197. Patchett, English Law in the West Indies, supra note 34, at 925.
198. Alexis, New Rights in the Commonwealth Caribbean and the American Con-
stitutions, in CURRENT ISSUES IN WEST INDIAN LAw: A TRIBUTE TO THE LATE SIR
HUGH WOODING, supra note 122, at 64.
199. Oliver v. Buttigieg, [1966] 2 All E.R. 459, 461.
200. Attorney Gen. v. Antigua Times Ltd., 3 All E.R. at 85.
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the right of life, 20 1 freedom from slavery, 20 2 and freedom from inhu-
man treatment. 20 3  The remainder, to one extent or another, may
either permit derogation from the basic right for specific purposes,
20 4
or, in certain circumstances, 2 0 5 be subject to interpretations of
"reasonableness."
Rather than attempt to describe in detail the nature and extent
of each of the constitutional protections afforded,2 0 6 the author will
focus on the standard forms of limitations on and exceptions to the
rights and freedoms provided in the constitutions.
The standard form of limitation on the authority of the legislature
in the fundamental rights sphere is one of "reasonableness." The
provisions of section 7 of the Constitution of Antigua well illustrate
the general position adopted:
7. (1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be subjected to
the search of his person or his property or the entry by others on
his premises.
(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law
shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this
section to the extent that the law in question makes provisions-
(a) that is reasonably required in the interests of defense,
public safety, public order, public morality, public health, public
revenue, town and country planning or the development and utili-
sation of any property in such a manner as to promote the public
benefit .... 207
The "reasonableness" of any enactment is a question for the
courts. Given a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of legisla-
tion,2 0 8 however, the courts will "presume, until the contrary appears
201. ANTIGUA CONST., § 2; DOMINICA CONST., § 2; ST. KITTS CONST., § 2; ST.
LUCIA CONST., § 2; ST. VINCENT CONST., § 2.
202. ANTIGUA CONST., § 4(1); DoMINICA CONST., § 4(1); ST. KITTS CONST.,
4(1); ST. LUCIA CONST., § 4(1); ST. VINCENT CONST., § 4(1).
203. ANTIGUA CONST., § 5; DOMINICA CONST., § 5; ST. KITTS CONST., § 5; ST.
LUCIA CONST., § 5; ST. VINCENT CONST., § 5.
204. See, e.g., DOMINICA CONST., § 6(6).
205. For example, during the continuance of a state of war.
206. Some studies worthy of note have already been done in this area; see Alexis,
New Rights in the Commonwealth Caribbean and the American Constitutions, supra
note 198 and Okpaluba, Fundamental Human Rights, the Courts, and Independent
West Indian Constitutions, in INDEPENDENCE FOR GRENADA, supra note 6, at 79.
207. ANTIGUA CONSTr., § 7.
208. This well accepted criteria has been analyzed in the Trinidad and Tobago case
of Attorney Gen. v. Mooto, (Unreported Court of Appeals decision, Civil Appeal No.
2, at 6-10) (1975) (Hayatali, C. J.).
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or is shown, that all Acts passed by the Parliament...were reasona-
bly required."209 The presumption is a rebuttable one, but the test
to be applied is a strict one. The following words of Lord Diplock in
connection with an analogous clause in the Constitution of Jamaica
well exemplifies this point:
The presumption is rebuttable. Parliament cannot evade a constitu-
tional restriction by a colourable device. But in order to rebut the
presumption, their Lordships would have to be satisfied that no
reasonable member of Parliament who understood correctly the
meaning of the relevant provisions of the Constitution could have
supposed that hearings in camera were reasonably required for the
protection of any of the interests referred to; or, in other words,
that Parliament in so declaring was either acting in bad faith or had
misinterpreted the provisions of. . .the Constitution under which it
purported to act.210
Following the precedent set in pre-independent British
Guiana, 21 1 all of the Constitutions here under review, with the excep-
tion of Antigua, provide for an additional test in relation to a substan-
tial number of the Fundamental Rights provisions.2 1 2  Basically, the
question is whether the legislation or activity under scrutiny is
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. It has been noted
that by virtue of such provisions, the Courts "have been empowered
to take into account the circumstances which obtain in the West In-
dies and in their decisions could well contribute to the development
of a differently conceived democratic society."' 213
Generally, when questions of reasonableness arise, "the onus is
on anyone seeking to impugn a statute to show that in the cir-
cumstances which existed at the time it was passed, the legislation
violated rights enshrined in the constitutions.' ' 214 In the cases of
Charles v. Phillips and Sealey 215 and Herbert v. Phillips and Sea-
209. Attorney Gen. v. Antigua Times Ltd., 3 All E.R. at 90.
210. Hinds v. The Queen, I All E.R. at 368-69.
211. Patchett, English Law in the West lidies, supra note 34, at 927.
212. See DOMINICA CO\'ST., §§ 6(6)(a), 7(2), 9(5), 10(2), 11(2), 12(3)(b), 12(3)(h);
ST. KITTS CONST., §§ 6(4)(a), 7(2), 9(5), 10(2), 11(2), 12(3)(b), 12(3)(h); ST. LUCIA
CONST., §§ 6(6)(iii), 7(2), 9(5), 10(2), 11(2), 12(3)(b), 12(3)(h); ST. VINCENT CONST.,
6(6)(vii), 7(2), 9(5), 10(2), 11(2), 12(3)(b), 12(3)(h).
213. Patchett, English Law in the West Indies, supra note 34, at 927-28.
214. Attorney Gen. v. Antigua Times Ltd., 3 All E. R. 81 (Corbin, J.A.). See also
Francis v. Chief of Police, [1970] 15 W.I.R. 1, 17 (C. Lewis, J.A.)
215. [1967] 10 \V.I.R. 423.
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ley, 216 however, the Court of Appeal of the Associated States decided
that in instances of emergency legislation, the onus of establishing
justification lays on the Crown. 217
The constitutions themselves provide for the temporary curtail-
ment of some of the ordinary rights and freedoms of citizens in times
of emergency.2 18  The basic formula used is well illustrated by the
provisions of section 14 of the Dominica Constitution:
Nothing contained in or done under the authority of a law enacted
by Parliament shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contraven-
tion of section 3 or section 13 of this Constitution to the extent that
the law authorizes the taking during any period of public
emergency of measures that are reasonably justifiable for dealing
with the situation that exists in Dominica during that period. 219
In each instance, the rights and freedoms adversely affected are the
right to liberty and freedom from discrimination. Extensive provisions
are, however, enshrined in the Constitution, which establish a certain
level of protection for persons detained under emergency laws.
2 20
An emergency is deemed to exist in any period during which
Her Majesty is at war, when a proclamation by the Governor declares
that a state of emergency exists, or when a Parliamentary Resolu-
tion, passed by special majority, declares that democratic institutions
are threatened by subversion. 22  The last two of these situations are
regulated by the Constitution in terms of the methods to be adopted
and the time frames in which they are to be effective .
222
The United Kingdom authorities have retained certain extensive
powers in the area of rights and freedoms. By virtue of the terms of
section 7(2) of the West Indies Act, Her Majesty may by Order in
Council, unilaterally, make "as part of the law of that state such pro-
visions as appear to Her Majesty to be appropriate, including (if by
reason of war or other emergency it appears to Her Majesty to be
216. [1967] 10 .IR. 435.
217. 1968 ANNUAL SURVEY OF COMMONWEALTH LAW 121.
218. Herbert v. Phillips, 10 W.I.R. at 444 (C. Lewis, J.A.).
219. DO\tINICA CONST., § 14. See also ANTIGUA CONST., § 13; ST. KITTS
CONST., § 14; ST. LUCIA CONST., § 14; ST. VINCENT CONST., § 14.
220. ANTIGUA CONST., § 14; DOMINICA CONST., § 15; ST. KITTS CONST., § 15;
ST. LUCIA CONST., § 15; ST. VINCENT CONST., § 15.
221. ANTIGUA CONST., § 16(4); DOmINICA CONST., § 17(2); ST. KITTS CONST., §
18(2); ST. LUCIA CONsT., § 18(2); ST. VINCENT CONST., § 18(2).
222. ANTIGUA CONST., §§ 16(5)-(7); DOMINICA CONST., §§ 17(3)-(5); ST. KITTS
CONST., § 17; ST. LUCIA CONST., § 17; ST. VINCENT CONST., § 17.
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necessary and that fact is expressly stated in the Order) provisions
derogating from the provisions of the constitution of that state relating
to fundamental rights and freedoms." 2
23
The retention of such powers by the United Kingdom was not
contemplated at the time of the 1966 Constitutional Conferences, 224 a
fact which was a subject of much controversy in the House of Com-
mons during the passage of the West Indies Bill. 225  Furthermore,
the authority so retained is open-ended and its exercise is non-
reviewable by the courts. 22 6 As a consequence, the possibilities for
abuse are similarly unlimited. The dangers associated with the reten-
tion of such absolute powers by the metropole are well illustrated in
the use of section 7(2) authority as the legal basis for the March 19,
1969 invasion of Anguilla by British Forces. 227 In this sphere, the
protection -afforded to the individual in the Associated States falls far
short of that enjoyed by the citizens of the independent Common-
wealth Caribbean territories.
By way of contrast, there is a sphere in which the constitutions
of the islands here in question provide for a considerable increase in
the scope of individual protection compared with that enjoyed by
persons within the independent states. This protection stems from
the fact, noted by Chief Justice Boller in D'Aguiar v. Cox, 228 that the
constitutional instruments contain no provisions similar in wording or
effect to the so-called "savings clause," which is common to all Fun-
damental Rights Chapters of the Constitutions of the independent en-
tities, with the sole exception of Grenada. 2 29 This rather curious
provision, which on its face is seemingly incompatible with the
philosophy of independence, has been consistently interpreted by the
courts, whether properly or not, 23 0 as saving pre-independence laws
from constitutional challenge in the human rights area. 231 It goes far
beyond such normal and necessary provisions as are designed to pre-
serve the validity of colonial or pre-status laws.
223. West Indies Act, 1967, c. 4, § 7(2).
224. See, e.g., WINDWARD ISLANDS CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note
5, at 8.
225. See PARL. DEB, supra note 14, at cols. 348, 382, 393-94.
226. See West Indies Act, 1967, c. 4, § 18(3).
227. See generally STAT. INST. 1969, No. 371.
228. [1971] 18 W.I.R. 44, 50.
229. STAT, INST. 1973, No. 2155.
230. See generally Alexis, When is an Existing Law Saved.?, 1976 PuB. L. 256
and Robinson, The "Saving-Law" Clause, 2 U.W.I. STUDENTS L. REv. 35 (1977).
231. See D.P.P. v. Nasralla, [1967] 2 A.C. 238.
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Not only is the savings clause scheme inapplicable to the As-
sociated States, but in a series of general constitutional provisions,
existing laws are subject to procedures designed to bring them into
accord with the new constitutional requirements. Section 103 of the
St. Kitts constitution 232 is illustrative of the approach adopted:
[S]ub-section (1) provided that all previous laws were, in effect, to
be read mutatis mutandis in order to conform with the new con-
stitutional arrangements, while sub-section (2) provided that where
any matter that fell to be prescribed or otherwise provided for
under the Constitution was provided for by existing law, that exist-
ing law should be treated as though it had been made by the com-
petent authority under the new Constitution. 233
In addition, by virtue of the terms of sub-section (3), the Governor is
empowered, for a limited period of time, to make such amendments
to any existing law as seem to him "to be necessary or expedient" in
order to bring it into accordance with "the provisions of the West
Indies Act of 1967, this Constitution and the Court's Order." 234 This
power is indeed considerable in scope, for as Chief Justice Lewis
noted in the Charles case, it includes "modifying, re-enacting with or
without amendment, suspending, repealing, adding new provisions,
or making different provisions." 235
If it is not possible to construe an enactment in such a way as to
make it compatible with the constitution, any amendment made by
the Governor notwithstanding, then the courts are obliged, by virtue
of section 103(1), to void the offending provisions "to the extent of
their inconsistency with the Constitution." 2 3 6
IV. TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS
The structure of government adopted is the traditional "Export
Model" of the Westminster form of Parliamentary democracy. The
Jamaican experience has been of considerable influence. The decision
of Jamaica to adopt such a system, however, was heavily influenced
232. ST. KITTS CONST., § 103. See also ANTIGUA CONST., § 107; DOMINICA
CONST., § 101; ST. LUCIA CONST., § 101; ST. VINCENT CONST., § 104. In a trilogy
of Kittian cases, the law in this area has been subjected to extensive judicial coin-
mentary. See cases cited notes 198, 216, and 217, and ST. KITTS CONST., § 103(1).
233. 1968 ANNUAL SURVEY OF COMMONWEALTH LAw 120.
234. ST. KITTS CONST., § 103(3).
235. Charles v. Phillips, 10 W.I.R at 432 (Lewis, C.J.).
236. Chief of Police v. Powell, 12 W.I. R. at 415, 432 (Glasgow, J.). These issues
are discussed in detail in Alexis, When is an Existing Law Saved?, supra note 230, at
256-62.
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by a genuine familarity with its inner workings. 23 7 In the Associated
States, this was not the case: "[i]t was not until 1960, a little over a
parliamentary term before the introduction of associated statehood,
that one was able to discern the first clear outlines of a constitutional
framework which contemplated a government responsible primarily to
the electorate." 2 38
It must be open to serious question whether the "Export
Model," even given the modifications which the author has noted,
can be regarded as appropriate to the needs of these communities.
The Westminster system, itself, evolved within the context of a large
advanced industrial economy. The Associated States of the Eastern
Caribbean are both small and underdeveloped. As a recent World
Bank study has clearly demonstrated, if poverty is used as the gauge
of development, these countries rate among the least developed in
the Latin American and Caribbean region. 239 With an average per capita
gross domestic product of U.S. $340, only Haiti is in a worse position.
Given the dimensions of these economic differences, one can
speculate that the minimum conditions for the successful operation of
the system are not present. 2 40  By 1973, the imitation of the
Westminster model (which brings with it the Whitehall system of
public administration) 241 had resulted in the creation of forty-two
ministries, supported by an establishment of 15,443 persons, at an
estimated cost of E.C. (East Caribbean Currency) $53 million, 242 this
figure representing approximately 42% of total estimated public ex-
penditures.
Even given the diseconomies of government with which small
states are confronted, 2 43 the available evidence suggests that in the
reception of this governmental structure, the Associated States may
be imposing economic non-viability on themselves.2 4 4
237. See Munroe, Origins of the Jamaica Independence Constitution, supra note
32, at 61.
238. Forbes, Constitutional Arrangements supra note 19, at 63.
239. See generally THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEE-
WARD AND WINDWARD ISLANDS (I.B.R.D. 1975).
240. See generally Patchett, The Caribbean Experience, supra note 13.
241. See generally Mills, Public Administration in the Commonwealth Carib-
bean: Evolution, Conflicts and Challenges, 1970 SOCIAL & ECON. STUDIES 16.
242. P. Emmanuel, V. A. Lewis & A. McIntyre, The Political Economy of Inde-
pendence for the Leeward and Windward Islands 43 (1975) (unpublished report
available for inspection at U.W.I., I.S.E.R. Library, Cave Hill, Barbados).
243. See, e.g., De Vires, Development Aid to Small Countries, in DEVELOP-
MENT POLICY IN SMALL COUNTRIES 164, 172 (1975).
244. See Emmanuel, Independence and Viability: Elements of Analysis, supra
note 57, at 9.
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
On a more positive note, the courts are given a crucial role to
play in the overall system of government. With the exception of the
reserved powers of the United Kingdom, the extent of the funda-
mental rights provisions contained in these constitutions, and their
efficacy in practice, are almost entirely dependent upon the role
which the courts decide to play.
In the spheres of emergency powers 24 5 and freedom of the
press, 246 the regional Supreme Court has not only reaffirmed its in-
dependence,247 but has also served notice that, in spite of a continu-
ing adherence to the common law traditions of the region, 24 8 it will
not be inactive when it perceives the occurrence of violations of these
enshrined rights. In adopting such a posture, the courts' position is
one of some strength in that, as a result of the regional nature of the
court structure, they have been effectively removed from political
pressures.
Finally, in the area of individual rights, the constitutions afford,
by virture of the absence of a "savings clause," a wider degree of
protection than has thus far been given to the inhabitants of the in-
dependent states of the region.
24 9
ADDENDUM
In the time which has elapsed since the above article was writ-
ten, there have been a number of significant constitutional develop-
ments in the territories in question.
The most important developments relate to the attainment of in-
dependence and full membership in the community of nations.
Dominica took that historic step on November 3, 1978250 and it has
recently become clear that all of the remaining Associated States will
be following suit in the near future. This decolonization process is at
245. Charles, 10 W.I.R. at 423; Herbert, 10 W.I.R. at 435.
246. Attorney Cen. v. Antigua Times Ltd., 3 All E.R. at 81. See generally D.
WHITE, THE PRESS AND THE LAW IN THE CARIBBEAN (1977) for an extensive exami-
nation of the legal aspects of freedom of the media.
247. See Okpaluba, Fundamental Human Rights, the Courts, and Independent
West Indian Constitutions, supra note 206, at 90.
248. See generally STAT. INST. 1974, supra note 103.
249. In theory, the reserved powers of the United Kingdom in this sphere are
sufficiently extensive to place in doubt the overall effectiveness of these constitutional
provisions, but they have never been used in this manner.
250. See, Washington Post, Nov. 3, 1978, at A-15; TIME, Nov. 13, 1978, at 56. See
also 4 BULL. OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS No. 2, at 1-23 (1978).
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its most advanced stage in St. Lucia and St. Vincent and it is likely
that both will have obtained independence prior to the publication of
this volume. The Government of Antigua is looking toward a late
1979 date, as is the Government of St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla. In the
latter case, however, the need to reach an agreement with the United
Kingdom over the future of Anguilla 25 1 and the recent rise in sepa-
ratist sentiment in Nevis 252 may delay the process somewhat.
This movement is reflective of widespread dissatisfaction with the
associated statehood scheme as embodied in the West Indies Act of
1967 253 but does not represent any serious desire on the part of the
territories in question to alter their internal constitutional instruments
in a radical manner. That general view is well reflected in the St.
Lucia Green Paper on Independence:
It is the view of the Government that the existing Constitution
is a sound document and has generally served us well. No substan-
tial changes have been made by Grenada nor have any been pro-
posed by Dominica, whose constitutions are similar to ours. Apart,
therefore, from the minor changes proposed below, no substantial
change is contemplated.2,5 4
At the present time, several constitutional changes have taken
place in Dominica and changes have been agreed to in St. Lucia. The
remaining jurisdictions will have to await treatment on some future
occasion. 255
In Dominica, the decision was taken to adopt a republican sys-
tem of government to be headed by a President whose powers are
restricted to non-executive matters. A suggestion that the President
be directly elected was not accepted and the Constitution now calls for
his selection by agreement between the Prime Minister 256 and the
251. For a detailed examination of the current status of Anguilla see generally
Simmonds, Anguilla-An Interim Settlement, 21 IW'L & COMP. L.Q. 151 (1972). See
also REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNMENTS
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ST. CHRISTOPER-NEVIS-ANCUILLA TO EXAMINE
THE ANGUILLA PROBLEM, CMND No. 4510 (1970).
252. See generally 10 CARIBBEAN MONTHLY BULL. 38-40 (1976) and The San Juan
Star, June 4, 1977, at 18; Aug. 18, 1977, at 13; Aug. 19, 1977, at 10; Aug. 20, 1977,
at 18; Aug. 27, 1977, at 10.
253. An extensive examination of the status question appears elsewhere. See gen-
erally W. Gilmore, Legal Perspectives on Associated Statehood in the Eastern
Caribbean, supra note 11.
254. GOVT. OF ST. LUCIA, OFFICE OF THE PREMIER, INDEPENDENCE FOR ST.
LUCIA, at 12 (1977).
255. As of this writing, it has not been possible to obtain the report of the St.
Vincent Constitutional Conference due to industrial action at H.M.S.O.
256. The new title for the Premier.
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Leader of the Opposition, subject to formal endorsement by the
House of Assembly. "In the event that agreement could not be
reached between the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposi-
tion, the matter would be decided by vote of the Assembly." 257 In
St. Lucia, however, the link with the monarchy was not severed.
Thus Her Majesty will, upon independence, remain as Head of State
and will be represented locally by a Governor-General; "(t]he ap-
pointment will be made by Her Majesty on the advice of the Prime
Minister." 258
In both Dominica and St. Lucia, the restructuring of the legisla-
tive branch of government received considerable attention. With re-
gard to St. Lucia, the dormant provisions of the 1967 constitution
relating to a Senate composed entirely of nominated members will be
activated.25 9 The bicameral system was also discussed in relation to
Dominica 260 but it was determined that a single chamber would be
more suitable.2 61 There was, however, a wide divergence of opinion
between Government and Opposition as to the composition of that
chamber. The Government was of the view that, in addition to the 21
elected representatives, it should include 9 nominated members; 5 to
be appointed upon the advice of the Prime Minister and 4 upon the
advice of the Leader of the Opposition. "The opposition delegation at
the [Constitutional] Conference favored a smaller Assembly with only
13 members elected from constituencies but with 8 additional mem-
bers elected on the basis of proportional representation from party
slates." 262 In the final analysis, it did not prove possible to reconcile
these divergent views and the independence Constitution incorpo-
rates the Dominica Government's suggestions while empowering the
House of Assembly to change the selection system for senators by a
simple majority vote. 263
In the sphere of fundamental rights and freedoms, the basic
thrust and structure of the existing provisions has been retained. In
both jurisdictions, however, there will be a number of modifications
257. DOMINICA: TERMINATION OF ASSOCIATION, CMND No. 7279, at 5 (1978).
258. GOVT. OF ST, LUCIA, OFFICE OF THE PREMIER, LAYMAN'S GUIDE TO THE
CONSTITUTION FOR AN INDEPENDENT ST. LUCIA, at 3 (1978).
259. See REPORT OF THE ST. LUCIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE, CMND No.
7328, at 3-5 (1978).
260. See REPORT OF THE DOMINICA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE, CMND No.
6901, at 3-4 (1977).
261. See DOMINICA: TERMINATION OF ASSOCIATION supra note 257, at 6.
262. Id. at 6.
263. Id. at 6-7.
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and additions to the 1967 Constitutional provisions. For example, in
both Dominica and St. Lucia, the circumstances in which a criminal
trial can take place in the absence of the accused will be specifically
regulated within the Constitution.
26 4
In addition, it has been agreed that, upon independence, the
Constitution of St. Lucia will specifically mention:
(a) that a person arrested or detained shall have the right to en-
gage a lawyer to represent him, and that he must be permitted
to speak to such lawyer in private; and
(b) the amount of bail fixed for a person who is arrested must not
be excessive. 265
Although it appears that the greater number of modifications to the
fundamental rights and freedoms provisions are narrow in scope,
this is not universally true. For instance, at the St. Lucia Constitu-
tional Conference in July 1978, it was agreed that:
Section 6(4) should be amended so as to permit the imposition of
reasonable restrictions on the remission to another country of any
amount of compensation for the deprivation of property for the
purpose of controlling the export from St. Lucia of capital raised in
St. Lucia or capital raised in some other country the government of
which has entered into arrangements with the Government of St.
Lucia for the purpose of controlling the export of such capital. 2 66
In spite of these and other changes, it is fair to say that the general
constitutional structures for Dominica and St. Lucia are substantially
similar to those created under the authority of section 5(1) of the
West Indies Act when the associated statehood experiment was first
introduced. If this experience is followed by Antigua, St. Kitts/
Nevis/Anguilla, and St. Vincent, which appears likely, then "The As-
sociated States of the Commonwealth Caribbean: The Constitutions
and the Individual" will continue to be of some value to those in-
terested in the contemporary constitutional realities of the Eastern
Caribbean islands.
264. See INDEPENDENCE FOR ST. LUCIA supra note 254, at 13; supra note 260, at
4-5.
265. LAYMAN'S GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION FOR AN INDEPENDENT ST. LUCIA
supra note 258, at 3.
266. Supra note 259, at 2.
